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Dynamic historical analysis of longer term migratory, labour market and human capital processes in the SEEMIG region

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HUNGARIAN **DEMOGRAPHIC**
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SEEMIG WORKING PAPERS SERIES

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Contents

Overview of abbreviations and acronyms

Abbreviation	Name
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EU 10	Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
EU 14	Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
EU 8	Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
SEEMIG countries/area	Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia

Executive Summary

This synthesis report was developed within the project SEEMIG *(Managing Migration and its Effects in SEE: Transnational Actions Towards Evidence Based Strategies)*, which is funded by the European Union's South-East Europe Programme and brings together the main findings of eight country reports on the situation of the South-Eastern European countries **Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia** and **Slovakia** elaborated by the project partnership. It offers a broad overview of the demographic development and structure in the SEEMIG area and the countries involved. In order to explain and to understand the demographic developments of the region it was necessary to embed them into the broader socio-economic and political developments. It became clear that countries in the region have different historical backgrounds, which cannot be reduced to a pure duality of Western type countries on the one side and former socialist countries on the other side. Socialism had different notions and impacts in different countries, and has also influenced market economies such as Austria or Italy to a certain extent.

The main aim of this synthesis report is to present and analyse the development of the population, fertility, mortality, net migration as well as age structures in the region. One of the main findings is related to the influence of the different socio-economic regimes: these resulted not necessarily in different patterns of population dynamics, but rather in a delay of general demographic trends (e.g. the momentum of birth decline). Thus, in spite of the differences between the socio-economic and political regimes, general trends of convergence and divergence could be traced in the region as far back as the 1950s. As such, with some delay in time, a convergence tendency of the total fertility rate and a disappearing variance of the rate emphasize the generality of a trend of low fertility throughout the region. As regards mortality, while an increasing life expectancy can be observed throughout the region, a growing divergence in the increase of life expectancy between countries is apparent. Similar divergences are prevalent in the context of economic development: while the SEEMIG area as a whole was and is a growing economic region in the long-term perspective and has improved its position against the world average, major differences among the countries within the region are prevalent. Some countries produce three times more GDP than the world average while others only produce half. These differences might also have influenced the fact that net migration also showed diverging trends; since the 1960s, the SEEMIG countries have been progressively characterised by a diversification of net migration rates. While some countries became immigration countries, others became or remained emigration countries.

Migration is has a marked effect on population dynamics in the SEEMIG area. The overall population growth of the region can be almost exclusively traced back in the recent time to immigration especially into **Austria** and **Italy**. However a closer look reveals that the SEEMIG region is also demographically highly diverse. Capitals, large cities, regions and countries closely linked to the European central axis, also known as the Blue Banana – which starts in London and Rotterdam and ends somewhere in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Lombardy – are growing, whereas peripheral regions situated mostly in the East and the South-East are shrinking and economically suffering. An examination of the regional level reveals that nearly 60 per cent of the SEEMIG NUTS3 regions are showing declining tendencies. Such regions can be found throughout all SEEMIG countries, but are concentrated in the Eastern and South-Eastern parts of the SEEMIG area. Nonetheless, most regions may expect increasing population ageing plus stagnating or even decreasing population

development in the long run; thus, migration will contribute as a mitigating or even reinforcing effect. Current economic and demographic growth poles are likely to remain demographic winners and currently shrinking regions will most probably face further depopulation. In both cases the recognition of demography is crucial, whether in preparing for further demographic pressure or addressing demographic thinning. In brief, regional disparities will most likely further intensify.

When zooming into smaller territorial scales by examining development paths of the local case studies as involved in the SEEMIG project, significant heterogeneity of the cases becomes apparent. National or global developments impinge as broader exogenous factors as well as a municipality's or city's relative positioning within a country take effect. Hence, a region's geographical location or centrality, its accessibility and connectivity and its intra-national economic and administrative integration also determine whether a municipality or city is shrinking or growing. Finally, specific endogenous local settings may be of decisive importance, i.e. labour markets structures and their change over time, educational establishments, specific migratory flows and urban-rural or cross-border mobility relations. However, even if most considered local cases face population decline, neither are effective strategies to counteract emigration or to manage population decline in place, nor are existing strategic papers underpinned by statistical data. In general, there is a dearth of proactive attitudes among local decision makers in relation to the future of the local demographic dynamics.

This synthesis report offers some general starting points to develop concrete policy measures. These include pro-active long-term management of population ageing, as well as the development of local adaptation strategies and preparedness for population decline. At the same time, although demographic and societal processes are deep-rooted and cannot be reversed easily, it seems important to implement place-based approaches that offer sustainable employment possibilities as well as innovative family policies that allow for a combination of work and family. The reality of migration in both of its forms – immigration and emigration – must be politically accepted and its full potential must be understood. However, employing ethnicity for political reasons cannot be deemed adequate in the face of increasingly highly mobile societies. Instead, policies actively addressing cultural and social diversity and recognizing different life styles and realities are more required than shelving arrangements. Finally, especially in the area of international migration, which is per se a transnational phenomenon, transnational cooperation and thinking outside the national context are relevant for generating win-win-win situations for all actors concerned: countries of destination, countries of origin and migrants themselves.

Infobox: The SEEMIG project and the context of Work Package 3

SEEMIG is a transnational cooperation project that is being implemented in the framework of the programme SOUTH-EAST EUROPE from 2012-2014. In order to facilitate evidence-based policy-making on the national, regional and local levels, and focusing on data availability and data enhancement, the main objective of SEEMIG is to better understand and address the longer term migratory, human capital and demographic processes of the SEE area as well as their effects on labour markets and national/regional economies.

The SEEMIG WP3 dynamic historical country report at hand provides an overview on the migratory processes in the context of economic, labour market, political and demographic processes. Focus is put on the origin and interconnectedness of their developments. There are reference periods for the analysis: first, a historical overview from 1950 until the present is given; second, the current situation analysed more in detail by looking at events of the last decide which define the present processes.

1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose, aims and structure

This synthesis report aims to elaborate an overview of the longer-term migratory and labour market developments in eight South-East European countries. Before going into the analysis of processes within the South-East European region, a critical appraisal of the delimitation of the region itself is necessary. As emphasised by Szűcs (1983), South-East Europe is a composite region that includes different social systems, reaching from 'Mitteleuropa' to the Balkans. The later so called 'SEEMIG region' (or 'SEEMIG area') arises from the logic of the SEEMIG partners' national backgrounds. While particular interrelations and dependencies are doubtlessly given, the region is marked by heterogeneous historical and structural conditions. The SEEMIG region can therefore not be directly understood as an organic region that could be demarcated as a functional region from surrounding countries.

As regards the scale of the analysis, the main scope of the long-term perspective (back to the 1950s) is on the national level; for the current structure, an analysis has been done for the regional level as well. The presentation of the longer-term perspective has proven to be a challenge, as the analysis aims to elaborate a comprehensive picture of processes in a heterogeneous region and an eventful historical time period. Some countries of the SEEMIG area have long functioned as democracies with market driven economies, whereas other countries used to be part of the socialist sphere, which was characterised by one-party systems, relatively autocratic political control of society and a centrally coordinated economy. After the fall of the communism, these states were confronted with the challenges of democratisation and market transition, and in some cases societies have faced enduring crises and instability. How these different legacies affect current demographic, economic and political trends and whether convergent or divergent processes are dominant in the region are the overarching questions of the dynamic analysis. Within the logic of SEEMIG it is important to assess these dynamics, as they are relevant for the evaluation of the main trends regarding migration and labour market, especially within the context of the foresight activities and the longer-term demographic prognoses carried out within the project.

There is a broad range of topics that are relevant for the labour market development and for migration in general as well as for specific types of migration in the region (e.g. irregular migration, forced migration, human trafficking, migrant integration), which within the scope of this report could not be elaborated to the extent desired. Selected topics that of particular relevance in the SEEMIG countries were, however, examined by project partners within the context of the country reports[1] and interested readers are referred to the latter for more detailed information.

In the chapters that follow, the main socio-economic, demographic and migratory developments are examined in a longer-term perspective back to the 1950s. In Chapter 2, special focus is put on three major time periods that have been identified as being particularly important for the developments in the region. In chapter 4, spatial dimensions of currently prevalent processes and patterns are analysed. Local case studies give insight into developments at the local level in the region. Chapter 5 draws conclusions from the historical analysis and provides a brief outlook on the main cross-cutting challenges and policy areas for the SEEMIG region.

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1   All available at www.seemig.eu.

1.2. Methodology

This synthesis report brings together the main findings of eight country reports that were elaborated according to common specifications for the South-East European countries of Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Slovakia by the SEEMIG project partnership in the framework of Work Package 3.[2] The report examines basic development patterns of migration based on longer-term national statistics on migration and other macro-statistical time series provided by the project partners as well as by the international databases of *Eurostat*, the *United Nations*, the *World Bank* and the *Maddison* project. The report builds moreover on findings and concepts of earlier projects such as 'Demographic and Migratory Flows Affecting European Regions and Cities' (DEMIFER)[3] and 'Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries as new Immigration Destination in the European Union' (IDEA)[4]. An essential source of information was also provided by two recent publications carried out within the project partnership (Böröcz 2009, Melegh 2012), from which this report draws conceptually as well as empirically. The results and findings of this Synthesis Report were additionally subject to thorough discussions within the SEEMIG partnership.

The findings of the data collection exercise carried out within this historical analysis and the SEEMIG project as well as earlier studies show that the quality of international migration statistics in general and particularly in the South-East European Region is poor. For the long-term historical analysis, the limited availability of complete long-term time series for migration and other demographic and labour market processes, proved to be difficult. However, also in the more recent timeframe, missing or incomparable data posed problems for the analysis. Data on migration flows and specific thematic data collections are of particular concern (e.g. emigration). The use of different data sources also results in differences in findings. Each finding must therefore also be interpreted against the background of the underlying data source. Detailed research about the availability and comparability of migration data in the analysed countries was done as part of Work Package 4 of SEEMIG.[5]

1.3. Theoretical and conceptual approach

The conceptual framework[6] of SEEMIG and this historical analysis are based on several main general observations. As such, the empirical work cannot be related to only one or two specific concepts. The idea of *'long durée'*, firstly presented by Braudel (1969), for example, or the concept of the *'Demographic Transition'* (Thompson 1929) are important theoretical approaches as well as the *'Migration System Theory'* (Zlotnik 1992). It is not the aim to present these well-known concepts within this framework of this paper. However, the authors believe that it could be helpful to understand the specific argumentation of the analysis if the explanatory power of three, more specific theoretical concepts are introduced briefly hereafter: a modified *'World System Approach'* as well as (a revised version of) the *'Push and Pull Model'* and the *'Model of*

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2   *These countries are hereafter often referred to as SEEMIG countries.*
3   *For further information see www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/Menu_AppliedResearch/demifer.html (consulted on 2 September 2013)*
4   *For further information see www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/ (consulted on 4 September 2013)*
5   *All country reports as well as the summary report are available on the SEEMIG website www.seemig.eu.*
6   *For further information see SEEMIG Working Paper 'Conceptual framework for modelling longer term migratory, labour market, and human capital processes', No. 1, May 2013. The paper is available on www.seemig.eu (consulted on 2 September 2013).*

the Migration Cycle', which is a systematic path of countries concerning their migration regime, driven by their economic and demographic development.

1.3.1. A modified World System Approach

As suggested by Melegh (2012) the '*World System Approach'* (Wallerstein 1974; Portes and Walton 1981; Sassen 1988) in a modified form could be helpful in furthering the understanding of longer-term developmental patterns in the South-East European region. This approach explains migration not as the result of an individual decision process, but as the consequence of political and economic structures and the break-up of non-market based economic and social systems. In the case of the former socialist economies in South-East Europe, the market transition and the inclusion of these regions into the global flow of capital became a major factor generating large scale migratory movements (ibid: 415). During the period of socialism, internal and international migration was regulated in a prohibitive manner by the state and after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the economic effects of the fall of the socialism system (de-industrialisation, unemployment and increasing wage differentials) became strong drivers of migration.

This analysis enforces the neoclassic macro-economic theory of migration, but as Melegh emphasises, the validity with regard to per capita GDP differentials is strengthened if it is linked to positions in global hierarchies. Moreover, as Thornton et al. (2012) show, individuals have clear ideas of developmental scales that correspond quite accurately to actual per capita GDP figures. As such, 'potential migrants' may well be aware of global inequalities and may even have clear ideas of complex sequences that might orientate them in their decisions on whether to migrate or not. These points also confirm the deliberations of the *'Push and Pull Model'* described hereafter, which underlines that it is the perception of positive and negative factors in countries of origin and destination that matter in the context of migration decisions.

1.3.2. Revisited Push and Pull Model

In line with the recommendations of the SEEMIG Conceptual Paper, the conceptualisation of migration in general is mainly based on a revisited version of the *'Push and Pull Model'*[7] elaborated by Lee (1966). This model assumes that all people are potential migrants, as people evaluate the attractiveness of their place of living and working and compare it to another possible and potential place of living and working. Different factors are relevant in the decision to migrate: positively perceived *pull factors* (e.g. high income, favourable job or business opportunities, a high global position of the country and promising expectations as well as, in the case of flight, the search for international protection minus factors) and negatively perceived *push factors* (e.g. high unemployment, economic break-down, low wages, a low global position of the country, lack of welfare or social benefits, perspectives that do not promise any change in to future, or persecution or war) associated both with the areas of origin and destination. It is the perception of these factors that is relevant for the decision to migrate; namely, the expected and perceived benefits of migration. Information on the region of destination is important in this regard. Depending on the life cycle and personal circumstances, the perception of pull and push factors is defined differently for every (prospective) migrant. *Personal factors* such as age, family status and education or language knowledge play a further determining factor in migration decisions.

7   *It has further been found that the size of a country can matter.*

However, apart from these factors, there are also *intervening obstacles* (legal barriers, migration costs, distance) that might hinder migration. Several circumstances, such as established *migrant networks* (ethnic communities, diasporas), can help to reduce intervening obstacles and lower migration costs and as such steer the direction of migration flows and perpetuate them. Furthermore, the individual decision to migrate, which is believed to be taken together in the family or community, depends on the extent of the individual balance of push and pull factors in the country of origin compared to the push and pull factors anywhere else as well as the intervening obstacles and personal factors.[8]

1.3.3. Model of the Migration Cycle

The *'Model of the Migration Cycle'* describes the empirical observation that national migration regimes change as a reaction to demographic dynamics and labour market structures. The concept is based on the idea that a society and the legal system of a country adapt with a delay to a new situation and develop a mechanism to handle new or evolving migratory circumstances. Countries change, for instance, from an emigration to an immigration country if the demographic reproduction is not guaranteed and the labour market is expanding. Countries and societies are in this sense 'learning' to manage immigration, which is historically often a new situation after a long time of emigration (Fassmann and Reeger 2012: 67).

The specific element of the model is the gradual accommodation to the new conditions, as illustrated in *Table 1*. The *starting position* can be described by stability. In the case of the above mentioned example, emigration is more important than immigration in this stage, or else net migration is zero. During the *intermediate or transition stage*, a former emigration country becomes, step by step, a new immigration country. The reasons for this change can primarily be seen as a consequence of demographic and economic developments. It is important to note that at this stage the political sphere overlooks this new situation or tries to ignore it. Consequently, this second step is characterised by a legislative gap concerning migration and integration issues.

Table 1: The concept of the migration cycle

Domain	Starting stage	Transition stage	Adaptation stage
Demographic and labour market characteristics	Young population; surplus of labour supply and unemployment; Emigration exceeds immigration;	Decrease in labour supply as time lag to decrease in births; economic increase enhances demand; net migration turns positive;	Decrease in labour supply and economic growth require continued immigration; net migration constantly positive;
Public intervention	Regulation of emigration; immigration is not a topic of the public discourse;	Conflicting public opinion; migration policy oriented on labour market;	Increased consensus building; differentiated management of migration; focus also on integration;

Source: Fassmann 2009, modified.

8   *Further information, see the SEEMIG Conceptual framework for modelling longer term migratory, labour market and human capital processes*

However, this step fades out into a third stage, which is called the *adaptation stage* or *post-transformation stage*. This stage's main characteristic is a newfound stability. Immigration is essentially accepted as a necessary supplement to a demographically diminishing working population, on the one hand, and a growing economy, on the other hand. A new political rationality emerges by integrating a means of controlling international migration into a differentiated legal system. Conceptual differentiations of inflows and legal differentiations of the individuals who are legally allowed to immigrate are important features of this phase.

The following analysis uses the '*Model of the Migration Cycle'* as a blueprint for long-term developments of countries. However it is neither postulated that all countries pass through exactly the same cycle nor is it assumed that the individual stages of the cycle last for the same length of time or exhibit identical characteristics. On the contrary, different patterns and trajectories could develop, e.g. from immigration to emigration status. Nevertheless, the concept of the model is helpful in observing the dynamic process of possible changes in the relation of emigration and immigration.

The analysis of this report is mainly guided by these three conceptual frameworks and approaches the long-term migration developments in the SEEMIG region from these perspectives. Considering that drivers of international migration are related to economic, political and demographic changes, this study places the historical analysis of international migration in the wider context of societal processes.

1.4. Acknowledgements

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2. Historical turning points and periods

Since 1950, South-East Europe has been characterised by several historical turning points that affected countries within the region to different extents. As mentioned in the introduction, it is necessary to emphasize the historically given heterogeneity of the region of analysis. Whereas all other part of Europe had more or less stable borders and political and economic systems, the Eastern and South-Eastern parts of Europe were affected by wars, post-war transformations and recovery, the breakdown of socialist regimes, the dissolution of countries and changes in political regimes from totalitarianism to democracy. Recently, the countries also experienced the accession or pre-accession arrangements to the greater economic and political space of the European Union. Most of the societal changes in South-East Europe are rooted in very principal and long-term developments that exhibit time lags, intensifications and phases of slow-down as well as convergences with the development in Western Europe. Nevertheless, although prominent scholars warn that in most historical analyses too much emphasis is put on political changes and patterns (Melegh 2012)[10], the importance of the political and economic changes are not-disputable.

Three main historic turning points are highlighted in this regard:

1.   The *installation of state socialism* in several SEEMIG countries and the closing of the Iron Curtain in the late 1940s. This political reorientation had severe consequences as it led to a new political, social and economic order in the countries concerned, including centralised coordination of economy and relatively closed borders vis-à-vis migration. It is, however, important to stress in this regard that there were different forms of socialism and therefore diverse impacts on the respective economies and societies.

2.   The breakdown of socialism and the *fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989/1990*. The change in the political regime from socialism to democracy in **Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania** and **Czechoslovakia** and the market transition not only led to the shaping of market-like economies, but also strongly influenced the overall socio-demographic development of these countries by creating possibilities for free movement of the population, which altered the number and direction of migration flows. For example, in some countries (**Bulgaria** and **Romania**), a rapid increase in the number of emigrants was noted during this period. As a further consequence of the breakdown of state socialism, new independent countries emerged and international borders changed (**Slovenia, Serbia** and **Slovakia**), which again lead to increased migration.

3.   The step by step *accession to the European Union* ('EU Enlargement') was a further turning-point that shaped socio-economic dynamics in the region. Integration into the second largest economic area of the world brought an overall change of regimes in the countries, making it necessary to modernise economies and implement imposed

10   *Especially when countries that represent varying political systems such as in the SEEMIG region are included in an analysis of long-term change.*

stability measures. In several SEEMIG countries, **Austria, Italy, Slovenia** and **Slovakia,** it also meant the abandonment of independent national monetary policies. Accession further entailed free movement of persons within the area of the Union, step-by-step inclusion into the free movement area of *Schengen* as well as harmonisation in various policy areas, including migration and asylum.

2.1. Divided Europe, 1950-1989

In the countries of the former so called 'Eastern Bloc' (**Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania** and **Slovakia[11]**) and Former Yugoslavia (**Serbia[12]** and **Slovenia[13]**), the installation of state socialism at the end of the 1940s induced major shifts in political, social and economic orders and paved the way for huge transformations. However, the developments in this region were much more differentiated than the term 'Eastern Bloc' would imply. While **Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania** and **Slovakia,** as members of the *Council for Mutual Economic Assistance* (COMECON), were oriented toward the Soviet Union, Former Yugoslavia (and with it **Slovenia** and **Serbia**) started the *Non-Alignment Movement* and held a special position within the Eastern European communist bloc.

In the domain of the economy, systems of centrally coordinated economies became dominant, and the distribution of goods, services and investments was planned and coordinated based on political and bureaucratic logic. The major political aim of this socio-economic regime was full employment of the entire working-age population, with minimal income and welfare disparities and an increase in economic output to outperform the Western market economy countries. To make the planned system operational, ownership based on the dominance of private property was changed very early on; industrial units were nationalised and agricultural production was restructured towards forms of collectivisation.

Despite these general characteristics, it must be emphasized that differences in economic systems existed next to each other and evolved over time. After 1966 and more formally after 1988, **Hungary** introduced limited market mechanisms into the framework of the centrally coordinated economic system. In socialist Yugoslavia, from 1950 onwards, workers' self-management was introduced as the social and economic model, which enabled a high degree of independence in economic work organisations and their greater exposure to the laws of the market than was the case in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. **Slovenia**'s economy was also considerably more liberal in comparison to the other Yugoslav republics; numerous economic and social reforms, especially in periods of crisis, aimed to offer more space for a market mechanism within the economy. Differences also prevailed regarding the level of development and prosperity. For example, while **Hungary** was characterised by relative affluence within the Eastern Bloc and widely seen as the 'happiest barrack' of the socialist camp, **Slovenia** was the most developed Yugoslav republic. Due to this differentiation, terms like 'east bloc' or 'the communist Europe' seem to be oversimplified.

Austria, following years of a centrally coordinated war economy, reinstalled the market economy after the Second World War, while **Italy** had never given up the market as the main regulatory instrument of the economy. With the economic and political division of Europe into two blocs and the implementation of the *Marshall Plan*, the differences between **Austria** and **Italy** and the countries in Eastern Europe grew. The Western orientation of **Austria** and

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11   Slovak Republic as part of Czechoslovakia until 1992.
12   Socialist Republic of Serbia as part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
13   Socialist Republic of Slovenia as part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Italy increased competition and made modernisations necessary; there was thus an increase of production and an orientation towards the export of industrial supplies. Both countries developed specific forms of social market economies.[14] After a phase of post-war reconstruction, both economies grew dynamically and their relative (global) economic positions considerably improved. Economic booms in **Austria** and **Italy** during the 1950s and 1960s, labelled 'economic miracles', led to an improvement of health, environmental and socio-economic conditions. However, also many countries of the socialist bloc countries were marked by industrialization and economic development, for example, **Hungary** also showed high growth rates during this time.

A turning point in the economic development of SEEMIG countries, especially **Austria**, **Romania** and **Italy**, was marked by *the oil crises of 1973 and 1979*, the first major post-war economic crises with a worldwide drop in production. The consequences were mainly reflected in a drastic increase of unemployment as well as a decline in living standards of the population and triggered major effects on social and demographic processes. In most of the COMECON countries, however, the oil crises had more an indirect and postponed influence.

An important feature of the period of a divided Europe, which was prevalent in all SEEMIG countries, was industrialisation. In particular, the European socialist countries (**Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania**, **Serbia**, **Slovenia** and **Slovakia**) followed the Soviet Union in developing schemes of investing a large segment of their resources into the enhancement of industrial production. However, some differentiation is necessary. While in **Hungary**, for instance, a more consumer oriented industrial structure was developed due to the lack of the centralised command economy following the mid-1960s, in **Romania** priority was given to heavy industry and the chemical industry. The restructuring of the agricultural sector was of further particular importance, as the decreasing share of agriculture was critical in all the countries. Both material resources as well as the labour force were redirected from agriculture to industrial development. At the same time, the share of the industrial sector in **Austria** and **Italy** declined in the 1980s, as the service sector grew.

Table 2: Share of employed persons by sector in Austria, Serbia and Slovakia in per cent, 1951–1991

Year	Serbia			Slovakia			Austria		
	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services
1951	–	–	–	55	25	20	32	37	29
1961	15	44	41	35	36	29	23	41	35
1971	9	45	46	25	41	34	14	42	42
1981	5	48	47	18	44	39	10	41	49
1991	5	52	42	13	43	45	7	37	55

Source: SEEMIG WP3 country reports.

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14   *In Austria, in the 1960s a specific form of Austro-Keynesianism emerged, which was characterised by the target of full employment and a co-operative income policy based on social partnership between employers and employees.*

The first decades after the Second World War were characterised by high fertility rates and population growth. This making up for 'lost war years' took place both in socialist countries of the Eastern bloc (**Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania** and the **Slovakia**) as well as in **Austria** and **Italy**. The high fertility rates in some SEEMIG countries were also partially supported by pro-natalist policies and imposed measures. This included restrictions on or prohibition of abortion as well as the installation of pro-natal financial incentives (e.g. 'tax on childlessness' in Hungary, strict anti-abortion measures in Romania after 1967). However, these measures did not succeed unrestrictedly.

During this period, most Eastern bloc countries (**Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania** and **Slovakia**) became relatively closed countries as regards migration with the exception of Yugoslavia, which officially allowed temporary emigration of 'guest workers' to Western countries. *Restrictive border control regimes* came into force, meaning that cross-border migration was controlled in both directions and mostly repressed. Entering or leaving the country (also for touristic purposes) was subject to special permits; possessing a passport and travelling abroad were limited rights and a privilege discretionarily administered by authorities, for example in cases of family reunification.[15] Those who departed illegally or did not return home from abroad were sanctioned by deprivation of citizenship, confiscation of property or imprisonment for illegal border crossing.

In the context of these migration restrictions, unauthorised emigration became increasingly common during the last decade of socialism. Major outflows occurred in the context of revolutions, such as in 1956 and the following year, when some 176,000 people left **Hungary**, and in 1968, when 162,000 refugees left **Czechoslovakia** in the context of the Prague Spring. These *refugees*, although in many cases also economic migrants, were granted asylum by Western European countries, including **Austria** which was the first safe country during the Cold War and thus both a country of destination and transit for refugees from countries in Eastern Europe.

A further characteristic policy pursued in socialist countries was that of *selective organised emigration*. While the emigration of their own nationals was obstructed, it was a common practice to organise and plan the emigration of 'undesirable groups', such as certain ethnic minorities and political critics the regime. As such, *en mass* migration of Jewish and German communities (Transylvania Saxons and Banat Swabians) was promoted in **Romania** and organised and financially supported by Israeli and West German authorities. Likewise, in **Bulgaria**, migration processes were expressed mainly through the emigration of persons of Turkish origin arranged by bilateral agreements between the Bulgarian and Turkish governments.[16] As in countries of the Eastern bloc, based on the Balkan Pact, controlled and ethnically selective emigration was also an essential feature in socialist Yugoslavia. As such, controlled emigration of the majority of ethnic Germans (beginning of the 1950s) and ethnic Turks, as well as other ethnic groups of Islamic religion was organised from **Serbia**.[17]

Temporary labour migration schemes were a further particular feature of migration processes of this time, which involved SEEMIG countries both as sending countries and as destination countries and have formed migration processes ever since. Within the COMECON, a circular form of labour migration of a limited number of professionals existed in some member states

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15 The settlement of politically favoured groups who received settlement permits, such as Greek refugees in 1949 and Chilean refugees in 1973 in **Hungary**, was an exception to these rules.
16 An exception was the emigration registered in 1989 due to forcible change of the names of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin.
17 It is estimated that around 40,000 ethnic Germans mainly from Vojvodina emigrated to **Austria** and Germany and 250,000 ethnic Turks to Turkey.

(especially **Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania** and Czechoslovakia). These flows were regulated by the states involved, and were intended to encourage temporary migration, not dissimilar the labour schemes promoted by West Germany toward **Hungary**, Poland or Yugoslavia. At the same time, following intensive economic development in Western European countries that produced an increased demand for industrial labour force, temporary employment schemes of foreign workers (so called 'guest worker' schemes) were launched, enabling a real expansion of international labour migration. **Austria**[18] followed the example of Western neighbouring countries and started with targeted recruitment of foreign workers from several Mediterranean countries (especially Turkey and Yugoslavia) in the 1960s. The liberalisation of emigration regimes, the need for migrant workers in the West German economy and the agency of each individual triggered guest-worker emigration from **Slovenia** to Western countries, especially to West Germany. In **Serbia**[19]**,** after limitations on leaving the country were abolished in the mid-1960s, temporary labour migration abroad was completely liberalized. Temporary labour migrants were also recruited from **Italy** as low-skilled workers in the industrial sector in northern European countries, especially West Germany.

The prevailing idea at first was that such migration would be temporary, but it soon became clear that many migrants continued to stay in destination countries. Despite attempts of both destination countries aimed at reducing the number of foreign workers in the context of the oil crisis of 1973 by means of recruitment stops and efforts of countries of origin to help returnees to start their own businesses in their country of origin (**Serbia**), migrants remained abroad. In contrast to political intentions, these measures also partly led to a consolidation of settlement of migrant workers. In **Austria**, fearing that they would lose their working place and residence status following more restrictive measures, many migrants who had been circulating between their country of origin and Austria postponed their return. In parallel, family reunification compensated for the numbers of persons who returned to their countries of origin.

With international migration being restricted and industrialisation strongly pursued in many countries, large scale internal migration flows were a further essential feature of the period, as the process of industrialisation induced a very intense concentration processes and a spatial redistribution of the population. The urbanisation process and concentration in basins were characteristic features during this time in Czechoslovakia, where internal migration between the later Czech Republic and **Slovak Republic** was shaped by economic and industrial policies. These migration dynamics were significant not only in terms of mutual influence on the population development, but also in terms of the socio-economic development of both republics.[20]

Internal migration was also a characteristic feature in socialist Yugoslavia. Particularly in the 1970s, when Western European countries that had been the primary countries of destination started limiting immigration as a response to the oil crisis, more pronounced internal migration occurred within the former Yugoslav republics[21], particularly towards **Slovenia**. This migration of mostly young, male migrants was caused by several circumstances: an accelerated industrialisa-

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18 *There was a need of foreign labour in the context of a booming economy and a lack of work force because of the loss of men during the Second World War, post-war emigration and a decreasing female labour participation rate in the context of the baby boom.*

19 *According to results of censuses carried out in 1971, 1981 and 1991, the number of Serbian citizens working or staying abroad continually increased (from 204,000 to 269,000 and then to 274,000), which meant that approximately every thirtieth citizen of **Serbia** lived abroad at that time (from 2.8% in 1971 to 3.5% in 1991).*

20 *During the existence of **Czechoslovakia**, 679,500 people emigrated from the Slovak Republic to the Czech Republic and 440,000 people emigrated from the Czech Republic to Slovak Republic.*

21 *Especially from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia.*

tion from the mid-1950s, when several hundreds of mostly unskilled workers moved to towns; unemployment in several former Yugoslav republics and almost full employment in **Slovenia**. Most migrants, although first labelled as temporary migrants, later stayed. In **Italy** as well**,** the labour demand generated by economic growth was for a certain period satisfied by internal migration, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s, when major internal migration flows from the South of the country (Mezzogiorno) ensued to the industrial North. This migration accelerated the urbanisation process in all countries.

2.2. The Fall of the Iron Curtain

In the late 1980s, a period of radical political and social transformations arose in the South-East European region. Besides political changes, the breakdown of socialist systems and the following democratic transitions launched various economic and social changes in the SEEMIG countries. While in **Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, and **Romania** this occurred without changes to the integrity of the state, the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia generated among others the SEEMIG countries **Slovenia** and **Serbia**; and the Czech Republic and **Slovakia** were created after the break-up of Czechoslovakia. The transition towards market-oriented economies, privatisation and the crisis of traditional industrial branches meant the end of official full employment and the appearance of unemployment as a new social phenomenon.[22] Employment rates worsened due to a lack of employment opportunities, especially for certain population groups such as lowly educated persons, young people, people just before the retirement age and marginalised ethnic groups, such as the Roma population. Early retirement was made possible for many workers instead of being dismissed, which raised the already high share of pensioners. The transformation was also characterised by a massive decline of industry and a significant setback in economic prosperity, which were reflected by a sharp decline in GDP values between 1989 and 1993 as well as a rise in inflation.

Another significant consequence of the fall of the socialist systems was an increase in social inequalities. While prior to 1989, the Eastern European countries had been characterised by a very low level of income differences, after the collapse of the state socialism regimes, income inequalities considerably increased. In spite of this trend, however, it is possible to distinguish between countries with a relatively low and relatively high level of income inequalities. After two decades of the economic transition, **Hungary**, **Slovakia** and above all **Slovenia** were among the countries where the income inequalities are relatively low. On the opposite end, **Romania** was characterised by quite high income differences.

Perhaps one of the most significant consequences of the fall of the Iron Curtain was the loss of political control over migration. The national borders became permeable and the way to a free unfolding of migratory processes was opened. The end of the 1980s thus represents a turning point in migration in these countries. Unrestricted travelling from 1988 onwards and the permeability of the borders after the transition opened a new chapter in migration. As Melegh (2012) stresses, the fact that the economies of these countries were included in the space of global capitalism had a significant impact on the migratory links of the countries within the region (ibid: 415). After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the economic effects (de-industrialisation,

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22   *The process of privatisation and economic re-adjustment to world capitalism ranged from a shock therapy in Estonia, on one extreme point, to a very smooth and gradual transition in* **Slovenia**, *on another. In this continuum,* **Hungary** *stood closer to the 'shock therapy' endpoint, contrary to other Visegrad countries that privatised their economy more gradually. In total, 1.5 million jobs were lost in* **Hungary** *and never recovered.*

unemployment and increasing wage differentials) were strong drivers within the migration system. In **Bulgaria**, emigration largely affected the population development in a negative manner. In the period from 1985 to 1992, the population of the country decreased by 461,000 persons. This decrease was almost entirely a consequence of the negative migration balance to Turkey, which received large numbers of people of Turkish origin from Bulgaria. In **Romania**, a total of 100,000 Hungarians left Transylvania between 1988 and 1992, the majority of them to Hungary. Hungarians were highly overrepresented among the emigrants between 1992 and 2002 as well. Emigration from **Hungary** had a sharp peak immediately after the collapse of socialism mainly due to non-Hungarian citizens who had arrived to the country in the previous years. This process was largely connected to transit migration from Romania and other countries to Western Europe.

Major outflows of refugees also arose from **Romania** in the last years of the *repressive Ceauşescu regime* and following. **Hungary** was the main destination for ethnic Hungarians; however, many of them also migrated to Western Europe (including **Austria**, Germany and Sweden). In order to curb the flow of Romanian asylum seekers, many Western European states amended their asylum laws by qualifying Romania it as a 'safe country of origin'.

Hungary transformed from a country of emigration into a destination country of international migration.[23] Immigrants came mostly from neighbouring countries, especially **Romania**, but also from Ukraine and Yugoslavia and its successor states. Between 1988 and 2007, approximately 200,000 foreign citizens received settlement permits (long-term or open-ended residence). In this way, a new institutional system of migration was established and, accordingly, legal frameworks, mostly of administrative and law enforcement nature, were laid down.

Migration processes in the successor states of Former Yugoslavia as well as in the neighbouring countries were largely formed by the *conflicts in the region*. The wars at the beginning of the 1990s set off major flows of migration. Over five million people are estimated to have left their place of residence by force in the 1990s. While many returned later, a major part of them permanently changed their place of residence. **Slovenia, Serbia** and partly **Hungary** were among the main destinations for these *forcibly displaced persons*.

Emigration from Former Yugoslavia was a further characteristic of the time. While emigration from **Slovenia** in this period was relatively low, intensified emigration from **Serbia** during the 1990s could be observed. According to the 2002 census, 415,000 Serbian citizens (5.3% of the total population) were registered to be working or staying abroad, which was an increase of over 50 per cent in relation to the previous 1991 census, making the 1991-2002 period the era of most intense emigration of Serbian citizens since the second half of the 1960s.

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23   *At the same time, a constant flow of emigrants also existed, not registered by Hungarian statistics but clearly reflected in the relevant mirror statistics.*

2.3. EU Enlargement

The new millennium opened the perspective of integration into the European Union for most SEEMIG countries. **Austria** joined the EU in 1995, **Hungary**, **Slovakia** and **Slovenia** nine years later in 2004; **Bulgaria** and **Romania** followed in 2007. **Serbia** acquired official candidate status in the year 2012. Economic reforms initiated in the pre-accession and accession periods were directed towards a neo-liberal order: fiscal policies became stricter to conform to the EU accession criteria, privatisation processes were accelerated and the countries became more open to foreign actors. Consequently, the amount of foreign direct investment grew considerably. The SEEMIG countries in Eastern Europe experienced step-by-step integration into the common market and a convergence of the political and economic systems, which can be addressed as 'Europeanisation'.

During the first years of the new millennium, the economies in the Eastern SEEMIG countries (**Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania**, **Slovakia** and **Slovenia**) developed dynamically, with annual growth rates in GDP per capita that were in certain years five to six times higher than the EU27 average. Reasons named for these developments in the country reports included large-scale privatisation, foreign direct investment and reforms of public spending (e.g. austerity packages in **Hungary**). Although it is still debated, the period from 2001-2011 is also perceived as an ending period of societal, institutional and economic transition.

Finally, at the end of the decade, in 2009, the global economic crisis caused a decrease of the GDP per capita, bringing about serious consequences in the whole region. The SEEMIG countries experienced a period of outright recession: GDP per capita in the countries declined by between 3.1 per cent (**Serbia**) and 8.8 per cent (**Slovenia**). In the last three years, after a period of stagnation, annual economic growth rates have increased again, but stayed at a lower level. One of the consequences of the economic crisis is the increasing unemployment and very low labour force participation rates – a serious problem in nearly all SEEMIG countries.

The increased European integration also brought free movement of persons within the area of the European Union: all Union citizens have the right to enter another EU member state without an entry or exit visa for three months. Upon fulfilment of specific requirements[24], Union citizens may also reside beyond this period without a residence permit and may acquire the right of permanent residence in the host member state after a five-year period of uninterrupted legal residence. The right of free movement was, however, not accompanied by an immediate right to enter the labour market without any restrictions for countries joining in 2004 and 2007. **Austria** and Germany asked for a transitional phase of up to seven years, when the restrictions to the freedom to enter the domestic labour market were abolished. In 2014, the last restrictions in this regard directed towards other SEEMIG countries will expire.

Furthermore, EU accession brought incremental inclusion into the territory of free movement of the *Schengen Area*. This possibility of free movement led to the creation of new labour markets, thus reinforcing inner-European mobility. A specific aspect of this includes the increase of cross-border commuters. Finally, former or continuing emigration areas became themselves destinations for migrants outside the Union, especially the Ukraine and Russia, as well as a place of entry and transit region for migrants and persons in search of international protection from third countries.

24   *The conditions include e.g. the engagement in economic activity (on an employed or self-employed basis); the presence of sufficient resources and health insurance; the attendance of vocational training as a student and presence of sufficient resources and health insurance; or being a family member of a Union citizen who falls into one of the above mentioned categories.*

3. Historical developments in retrospect

In the last sixty years, the SEEMIG region has faced a number of major macro-political, economic and social changes, which have determined demographic, migratory, and labour-market processes in the region to a great extent. To understand these dynamics, it was necessary to take a medium-long term approach that considers the overall historically structured situation and the development of the region as well as the changes in world migratory systems, especially regarding Europe. For this reason, changes in political systems as well as changing international borders over time in the region were considered. While the importance of such political events is stressed, it is also important to take the role of social and economic developments into account. For this purpose and for a broader and comprehensive analysis, the study also examines underlying and resulting socio-economic and demographic processes and patterns.

3.1. Socio-economic advances and setbacks

In the last 60 years, economic development in the SEEMIG region has been characterised by profound socio-economic changes in an altering international context. Following the miseries of the Second World War, the region grew dynamically. Particularly high GDP per capita growth rates were recorded in the late 1950s and 1960s as well as in after the transformation period of the early 1990s. As shown in *Figure 1*, these developments were interrupted by the oil crises in 1974 and 1979, the period of break-up of socialism and the wars in Former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s as well as the recent financial and economic crisis of 2008.

On the whole, the SEEMIG region was and is an economic growth region and has improved its position against the world average (see *Figure 2*). However, major differences among the countries within the region prevail and the gap between the countries became wider during the reference period. **Austria** and **Italy** show the comparatively highest GDP per capita values. GDP per capita values in **Austria** doubled from 176 to almost 350 per cent of the world average in 2000 and after a decline since 2008 lay at 300 per cent in 2010. **Italy**'s relative value also doubled from 150 to 320 per cent in the early 1990s; however, since then, the relative position has declined to 237 per cent of the world average. Both countries follow in this regard the trajectories of Western European countries. **Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania**, **Serbia** and **Slovakia** followed the trend of Eastern European countries, with values between 57 and 150 per cent of the world average. The lowest comparative values were recorded for **Romania**, which reached the world average at its best time in 1976 with 96 per cent and was at 57 per cent in 2010. While **Austria** and **Italy** improved their relative position to a large extent, in 2010 **Hungary**, **Romania** and **Slovakia** were almost at the level of 1950. **Slovenia** was between the two types: its GDP per capita values reached their highest relative position in 1975 with 251 per cent. In 2010, its GDP per capita amounted to 224 per cent of the world average.

A major general characteristic of the economic development was the transition of the countries to (post-)industrial and service economies. In the beginning of the reference period, up to 55 per cent of the labour force were still employed in agriculture and at the end of the period the share had dropped to below 5 per cent. In contrast to this decline, the employment in industry rose until the 1980s. European socialist countries (**Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania**, **Serbia**, **Slovenia** and

ILLUSTRATIONS

Contents

Figure 1: GDP per capita growth (annual %), 1950–2009[a]

Source: Maddison GDP/capita database, own illustration. Values for Slovakia and the Czech Republic before 1992, own calculations.

Figure 2: GDP per capita in SEEMIG countries compared to the world average, 1950–2010[b]

*Source: Maddison GDP/capita database, own illustration. Values for **Slovakia** and the Czech Republic before 1992, own calculations based on methodology first applied by Böröcz (2009).*

a   30 W. Europe refers to Andorra, **Austria**, Belgium, Channel Island, Cyprus, Denmark, Faeroe, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, **Italy**, Luxemburg, Lichtenstein, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 7. E. Europe refers to Albania, **Bulgaria**, (former) Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and **Slovakia**), **Hungary**, Yugoslavia (later the successor countries, including **Serbia** and **Slovenia**), Poland and **Romania**.

b   For the list of countries belonging to 30 W. Europe and 7. E. Europe see figure 1.

Figure 3: Unemployment, total (% of total labour force), 1991–2011

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Figure 4: Average annual rate of population change (percentage), 1950–2010

Source: UN World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, own illustration.

Figure 5: Total Fertility rates, 1950–2010

Source: UN World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, own illustration.

Figure 6: Net migration rates in SEEMIG countries (per 1,000), 1950-2010[c]

Source: UN World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, own illustration.

c   These net migration numbers are blurred and they do not show trends regarding immigration and emigration sep-
    arately. Furthermore, emigration data is often unreliable. For further information see the results of SEEMIG Data
    analysis.

Figure 7: Life expectancy at birth, total (years)

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Figure 8: Life expectancy at birth, males (years)

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Figure 9: Life expectancy at birth, females (years)

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Figure 10: Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population), 1950–2012

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Figure 11: Components of population change in SEEMIG countries 2001–2011 (annual average per 1000)

Data source: SEEMIG partners
*Serbia: reference is census 2002
**Note: According to the residual method and in line with Eurostat, net migration figures were derived from the difference between total population change and natural change, hence, refers to net migration plus statistical adjustment. This may significantly deviate from rates calculated as differences between registered emigration flows and immigration flows.

	EU15		EU8		EU2		IPA		SEEMIG avg.
	AT	IT	HU	SI	SK	BG	RO	RS*	
Total population change	4.6	4.2	−2.1	3.0	0.3	−7.9	−4.5	−4.1	0.5
Natural population change	0.3	−0.2	−3.5	0.3	0.4	−4.8	−1.9	−3.7	−1.3
Calculated net migration**	4.3	4.4	1.4	2.7	−0.1	−3.1	−2.6	−0.4	1.8
Classified as …	A	B	E	A	C	F	F	F	B

Figure 12: Age structure in SEEMIG regions 2011, according to broad age groups (in %, NUTS3)

(NUTS3; n=280)

■ 0–14　　■ 15–64　　■ 65+

Figure 13: SEEMIG regions – GDP at current market prices in 2010, purchasing power standard per 1.000 inhabitants in relation to population development 2001–2011 (NUTS2)

Without Serbia and Serbian regions.
Data source: SEEMIG partners (NSOS), GDP: Eurostat.

** Serbia: only NUTS0 level.

Map 1: Demographic typology 2001–2011 (NUTS0)

Map 2: GDP at current market prices 2010, purchasing power standard per inhabitant
(level index EU27 = 100, NUTS0)

Map 3: Demographic typology 2001–2011 (NUTS3)

(c) 2013 SEEMIG UniVie
Data Source: SEEMIG (NSO's)
Boundaries by EuroGeographics and SORS (for Serbia)

Map 4: GDP at current market prices in 2010, purchasing power standard per inhabitant
(level index EU27 = 100, NUTS2)*

(c) 2013 SEEMIG UniVie
Data Source: SEEMIG (NSO's)
Boundaries by EuroGeographics and SORS (for Serbia)

ADDITONAL ILLUSTRATIONS – Chapter 3

Map 5: Net migration, annual average (per 1,000) in the SEEMIG region, 1950–1990

Map 6: Net migration, annual average (per 1,000) in the SEEMIG region, 1990–2000

Map 7: Net migration, annual average (per 1,000) in SEEMIG the region, 2000–2010

Table I: Average net migration rates per 1,000 inhabitants, 1950–2010

Country/Region	1950–1960	1960–1970	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2010	1950–2010
Europe	−0.7	0.1	0.6	0.7	1.3	2.5	**0.8**
Eastern Europe	−0.8	−0.6	0.1	0.4	0.7	1.2	**0.2**
Western Europe	0.6	3.0	1.4	2.0	3.1	2.3	**2.1**
Bulgaria	−2.2	−0.1	−1.6	−2.3	−5.5	−2.2	**−2.3**
Hungary	−1.5	−0.1	0.4	−2.1	1.7	1.6	**0.0**
Romania	−0.2	−0.2	−0.1	−1.1	−3.2	−0.5	**−0.9**
Slovakia	2.3	−1.9	−0.5	−1.4	−0.3	0.7	**−0.2**
Italy	−1.6	−0.9	0.3	0.5	0.7	6.4	**0.9**
Serbia	−0.2	−2.2	−0.2	−0.4	2.3	−5.7	**−1.1**
Slovenia	−2.8	−2.2	2.5	5.7	−0.8	3.0	**0.9**
Austria	−2.0	1.0	1.0	1.6	3.8	4.5	1.7

Source: UN World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, own illustration.

Figure 14: Infant mortality rate on NUTS0 level, 1950–2011

Source: SEEMIG Country Reports.

**Table II: Immigrant and emigrant stock of SEEMIG countries
by top 10 countries of origin/destination, 2010**

Austria

#	Country of origin	Total	%	Country of destination	Total	%
#1	Germany	196,399	15%	Germany	296,793	47%
#2	Serbia	171,352	13%	United States of America	69,241	11%
#3	Turkey	162,284	12%	Switzerland	65,363	10%
#4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	136,225	10%	Canada	23,786	4%
#5	Romania	61,690	5%	United Kingdom	21,963	3%
#6	Poland	57,934	4%	Australia	19,004	3%
#7	Czech Republic	48,283	4%	Turkey	16,060	3%
#8	Hungary	39,040	3%	France	13,233	2%
#9	Croatia	35,122	3%	Spain	9,800	2%
#10	Russian Federation	27,191	2%	Israel	8,158	1%
***	Other countries	374,698	29%	Other countries	92,153	14%
***	**Total**	**1,310,218**	**100%**	**Total**	**635,554**	**100%**

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2012). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2012).

**Table II: Immigrant and emigrant stock of SEEMIG countries
by top 10 countries of origin/destination, 2010 (continued)**

Bulgaria

#	Country of origin	Total	%	Country of destination	Total	%
#1	Russian Federation	40,705	38%	Turkey	538,691	44%
#2	Ukraine	10,009	9%	Spain	157,434	13%
#3	Turkey	5,549	5%	Germany	105,174	9%
#4	Syrian Arab Republic	3,541	3%	Greece	91,625	8%
#5	Republic of Moldova	3,493	3%	United States of America	70,983	6%
#6	Poland	3,347	3%	United Kingdom	50,290	4%
#7	China	3,053	3%	Italy	46,997	4%
#8	Germany	2,782	3%	Canada	18,596	2%
#9	Armenia	2,187	2%	Romania	15,819	1%
#10	Serbia	2,117	2%	Austria	13,813	1%
***	Other countries	30,462	28%	Other countries	107,876	9%
***	**Total**	**107,245**	**100%**	**Total**	**1,217,298**	**100%**

Italy

#	Country of origin	Total	%	Country of destination	Total	%
#1	Romania	915,665	21%	Germany	879,888	24%
#2	Albania	507,448	11%	France	591,461	16%
#3	Morocco	463,987	10%	United States of America	495,041	14%
#4	China	195,744	4%	Canada	336,624	9%
#5	Ukraine	177,043	4%	Australia	211,114	6%
#6	Philippines	130,698	3%	Argentina	198,319	5%
#7	Tunisia	115,093	3%	Switzerland	194,959	5%
#8	Poland	114,262	3%	Belgium	170,436	5%
#9	India	105,601	2%	United Kingdom	114,119	3%
#10	Republic of Moldova	102,806	2%	Spain	89,564	2%
***	Other countries	1,635,066	37%	Other countries	341,190	9%
***	**Total**	**4,463,413**	**100%**	**Total**	**3,622,715**	**100%**

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2012). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2012).

**Table II: Immigrant and emigrant stock of SEEMIG countries
by top 10 countries of origin/destination, 2010 (continued)**

Hungary

#	Country of origin	Total	%	Country of destination	Total	%
#1	Romania	176,895	48%	Germany	104,431	21%
#2	Russian Federation	36,348	10%	United States of America	86,892	17%
#3	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	33,746	9%	Canada	52,609	11%
#4	Germany	24,897	7%	Austria	39,040	8%
#5	Austria	6,182	2%	United Kingdom	37,717	8%
#6	Ukraine	5,988	2%	Australia	21,379	4%
#7	China	5,096	1%	Switzerland	20,017	4%
#8	United States of America	3,817	1%	Russian Federation	19,118	4%
#9	Poland	3,650	1%	Sweden	16,465	3%
#10	France	3,101	1%	France	15,194	3%
***	Other countries	68,356	19%	Other countries	88,163	18%
***	**Total**	**368,076**	**100%**	**Total**	**501,025**	**100%**

Romania

#	Country of origin	Total	%	Country of destination	Total	%
#1	Bulgaria	15,819	12%	Italy	915,665	32%
#2	Russian Federation	11,923	9%	Spain	749,973	26%
#3	Belarus	10,830	8%	United States of America	188,856	7%
#4	Germany	10,330	8%	Germany	178,503	6%
#5	Slovakia	8,396	6%	Hungary	176,895	6%
#6	Czech Republic	7,842	6%	Israel	149,313	5%
#7	Lithuania	7,792	6%	Canada	94,428	3%
#8	Viet Nam	7,223	5%	United Kingdom	76,402	3%
#9	Republic of Moldova	6,604	5%	Austria	61,690	2%
#10	Hungary	5,821	4%	Greece	52,864	2%
***	Other countries	40,177	30%	Other countries	218,205	8%
***	**Total**	**132,757**	**100%**	**Total**	**2,862,794**	**100%**

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2012). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2012).

**Table II: Immigrant and emigrant stock of SEEMIG countries
by top 10 countries of origin/destination, 2010 (continued)**

Serbia

#	Country of origin	Total	%	Country of destination	Total	%
#1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	168,704	32%	Germany	280,460	27%
#2	Croatia	155,271	30%	Austria	171,352	16%
#3	Montenegro	79,603	15%	United States of America	103,331	10%
#4	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	60,501	12%	Turkey	82,998	8%
#5	Slovenia	14,508	3%	Italy	66,479	6%
#6	Germany	7,817	1%	Australia	59,905	6%
#7	Romania	4,948	1%	Canada	21,854	2%
#8	Austria	3,660	1%	Norway	18,271	2%
#9	France	3,289	1%	Slovenia	16,459	2%
#10	Russian Federation	2,155	0%	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	16,159	2%
***	Other countries	24,932	5%	Other countries	218,237	21%
***	**Total**	**525,388**	**100%**	**Total**	**1,055,505**	**100%**

Slovakia

#	Country of origin	Total	%	Country of destination	Total	%
#1	Czech Republic	14,057	11%	Czech Republic	72,303	24%
#2	Romania	10,770	8%	United Kingdom	46,421	15%
#3	Poland	10,335	8%	Germany	42,390	14%
#4	Belarus	9,706	7%	Austria	23,853	8%
#5	Ukraine	9,391	7%	United States of America	20,766	7%
#6	Germany	9,259	7%	Canada	17,093	6%
#7	Hungary	6,191	5%	Switzerland	11,035	4%
#8	Serbia	5,629	4%	Italy	9,302	3%
#9	Viet Nam	4,532	3%	Romania	8,396	3%
#10	Russian Federation	4,274	3%	Spain	7,758	3%
***	Other countries	46,538	36%	Other countries	43,024	14%
***	**Total**	**130,682**	**100%**	**Total**	**302,341**	**100%**

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2012). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2012).

**Table II: Immigrant and emigrant stock of SEEMIG countries
by top 10 countries of origin/destination, 2010 (continued)**

Slovenia

#	Country of origin	Total	%	Country of destination	Total	%
#1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	65,092	40%	Germany	34,099	19%
#2	Croatia	45,671	28%	United Kingdom	30,948	17%
#3	Serbia	16,459	10%	Austria	15,722	9%
#4	Montenegro	8,863	5%	Serbia	14,508	8%
#5	Germany	5,169	3%	Canada	10,694	6%
#6	Ukraine	3,757	2%	United States of America	7,758	4%
#7	Romania	2,585	2%	Australia	6,596	4%
#8	Italy	2,508	2%	France	3,802	2%
#9	Austria	2,490	2%	Italy	3,565	2%
#10	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1,318	1%	Switzerland	3,080	2%
***	Other countries	9,982	6%	Other countries	53,387	29%
***	**Total**	**163,894**	**100%**	**Total**	**184,159**	**100%**

ADDITONAL ILLUSTRATIONS – Chapter 4

Map 8: Population change 2001–2011 NUTS3 annual average per 1.000

Map 9: Calculated net migration balance 2001–2011 NUTS3 annual average per 1.000

Map 10: Demographic typology NUTS3

Map 11: Old age dependency ratio 2011 NUTS3

Table III: Overview on SEEMIG regions: selected core indicators (NUTS2 and NUTS3)

NUTS2

	Growing regions								
	A_pos *n=13*			B_pos *n=16*			C_pos *n=3*		
	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.
Population change 2001–2011	5.86	0.78	10.58	4.00	0.28	8.21	0.68	0.03	1.17
Calculated migration balance 2001–2011	4.18	0.10	15.86	6.00	1.20	9.87	-0.56	-1.00	-0.33
Old age dependency ratio 2011 (in %)	25.80	15.86	30.54	31.65	22.48	43.21	23.49	18.80	27.75
Unemploy-ment rate 2011	6.65	2.50	18.70	7.52	3.30	19.80	11.47	5.80	15.50
GDP at current market prices 2010, PPS per inhabitant (level index EU27 = 100)	119.54	49.00	165.00	101.13	66.00	133.00	102.33	64	176.00

NUTS2

	Shrinking regions									SEEMIG avg.		
	D_pos *n=2*			E_pos *n=6*			F_pos *n=21*			*n=61*		
	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.
Population change 2001–2011	-2.80	-3.34	-2.25	-1.22	-2.38	-0.24	-6.40	-16.89	-0.36	-0.08	-16.89	10.58
Calculated migration balance 2001–2011	-3.07	-3.74	-2.39	1.54	0.54	3.13	-2.94	-7.64	-0.20	1.47	-7.64	10.02
Old age dependency ratio 2011 (in %)	23.72	19.46	27.98	25.12	17.55	33.36	23.71	17.31	33.12	26.37	15.86	43.21
Unemploy-ment rate 2011	8.75	4.80	12.70	7.50	3.50	9.50	13.06	5.20	25.70	9.48	2.50	25.70
GDP at current market prices 2010, PPS per inhabitant (level index EU27 = 100)	47.00	29.00	65.00	82.50	57.00	111.00	43.06	26.00	70.00	83.19	26.00	176.00

Data source: SEEMIG partners, Eurostat (IT and RO: data on age, all countries: data on unemployment and GDP)

Table III: Overview on SEEMIG regions: selected core indicators (NUTS2 and NUTS3) (continued)

NUTS3

	Growing regions								
	A_pos n=46			B_pos n=71			C_pos n=10		
	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.
Population change 2001–2011	6.47	1.12	13.47	4.98	0.24	19.41	1.01	0.03	3.23
Calculated migration balance 2001–2011	5.03	0.37	12.84	7.22	1.35	20.54	-0.94	-2.27	-0.12
Old age dependency ratio 2011 (in %)	26.59	16.20	32.20	23.40	17.60	44.60	23.45	15.50	27.80

NUTS3

	Shrinking regions									SEEMIG avg.		
	D_pos n=22			E_pos n=29			F_pos n=102			n=280		
	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.	avg.	min.	max.
Population change 2001–2011	-3.50	-30.13	-0.13	-2.00	-5.70	0.04	-7.93	-23.73	-0.46	-1.01	-30.13	19.41
Calculated migration balance 2001–2011	-4.43	-31.84	-0.16	1.77	0.04	5.95	-3.99	-23.29	-0.07	1.01	-31.84	20.54
Old age dependency ratio 2011 (in %)	23.44	16.50	30.00	28.97	18.20	45.60	25.97	17.20	37.80	27.72	15.50	45.60

Data source: SEEMIG partners, Eurostat (IT and RO: data on age, all countries: data on unemployment and GDP)

Slovakia) invested a big segment of their resources into enhancing industrial production. Southern European countries such as **Italy** also saw moderate industrialisation in the period of the 1950s to the 1970s, caused by the increasing integration of the European economy. While in some areas (**Romania**) the collapse of the industrial production in the former socialist countries after the breakdown of socialism led to re-ruralisation of parts of the population (subsistence agriculture),[25] the main portion of employed persons were absorbed by the service sector. This change to (post-)industrial and service economies had major implications on labour markets, especially regarding the need for a higher qualified and specialised work force. However, the older work force trained as blue collar workers in the industry lost their workplaces and became unemployed.

During socialism in many SEEMIG countries the official employment policy was that of full employment of the manpower, meaning that officially unemployment did not exist. Data for the period after 1991 shows that the unemployment rate in the entire SEEMIG region was above 10 per cent. However, it is possible to observe a low unemployment rate in the countries with a high GDP, a growing economy and a sectorial change that dates back for many decades. Countries with a more recent sectorial change, a low GDP and a stagnating economy, in contrast, show high unemployment. **Serbia** and **Bulgaria** are examples of the latecomers in changing the main sectorial structure.

Finally, the SEEMIG region gains from monetary remittances that are transferred by emigrants and by diaspora members living abroad. Migrants' remittances even played a major factor in the economies of some of the reporting countries during the period of observation (Böröcz 2012). They grew from very low levels to up to officially 25 million USD in **Romania** in 2008. In relative terms of GDP, remittances amounted to 7 per cent in **Serbia** and 3 per cent in **Bulgaria**. In **Serbia**, the highest inflow of foreign remittances was realised in 2009. The amount of foreign remittances in 2011 amounted to 89 per cent of the realised amount from 2009. Most of the foreign remittances to **Serbia** between 2007 and 2010 came from Germany (USD 1,324 million), Austria (USD 639 million), Switzerland (USD 419 million), France (USD 316 million) and Sweden (USD 166 million). This distribution of the source countries of remittances to **Serbia** reflects the distribution of the Serbian Diaspora. Remittances not only exert a major effect on macro-economic indicators, but also have a strong impact on the micro level, such as in improving the standard of living of recipients. In contrast, in SEEMIG countries like **Austria**, remittances' outflows to main regions of migrants' origin are more important in numbers than inflows.

3.2. Population stock and population change

Over the reference period, the population size in the SEEMIG region has grown from around 100 million people in 1950 to 122 million in 2011. However, major differences in the demographic developments of countries can be observed. Some countries experienced constant population growth during the entire reference period, including **Austria**, **Italy** and with some fluctuations, **Slovakia** and **Slovenia**. All other countries were affected by population decrease. This was the case for **Hungary** and **Bulgaria** starting at the beginning of the nineties and has also been the case for **Serbia** and **Romania** since the beginning of the new millennium.The long-term distribution of growth and decline is quite diverse and underlines the need for differentiation and specific explanations.

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25   In **Romania**, in 2012, 29 per cent of employees worked in agriculture.

Table 3: Population stock on 1 January in SEEMIG countries, 1951–2011 (in thousands)

Countries	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	Change 1951–2011
Austria	6,926	7,065	7,479	7,553	7,711	8,021	8,404	1,478
Bulgaria	7,273	7,906	8,515	8,877	8,669	8,149	7,505	232
Hungary	9,383	10,006	10,354	10,713	10,355	10,200	9,986	603
Italy	47,539	50,374	47,793	56,479	56,744	56,961	60,626	13,087
Romania	16,505	18,587	20,470	22,353	23,185	22,430	21,414	4,909
Serbia	6,171	6,678	7,203	7,729	7,823	7,498	7,187	1,016
Slovakia	3,486	4,018	4,540	4,996	5,311	5,379	5,435	1,950
Slovenia	1,504	1,592	1,730	1,896	2,000	1,990	2,050	546
SEEMIG Region	**98,787**	**106,226**	**108,083**	**120,596**	**121,798**	**120,629**	**122,607**	**23,820**

*Source: NSA, SEEMIG WP3 Country Reports. Figures for 1951 for **Austria** and **Italy** from 1952. For **Slovakia** from 1950. For **Serbia** and **Slovenia** from 1953. Values for **Serbia** for 2001 from 2002. Values for **Romania** for 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 from UN World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, values for mid-year.*

As shown in *Figure 3*, the SEEMIG region as a whole has been a growing region however, two things are apparent: first, that this was mainly the case because of immigration to immigration countries within the region (**Austria** and **Italy**), which also stemmed from other countries within the region. Secondly, the speed of growth is declining (see *Figure 4*). At the beginning of the reporting period, the annual growth rate exceeded 0.5 per cent each year. After a period of slow decline, the growth became negative after the fall of the Iron Curtain. A significant decline of the birth rates and increasing emigration flows were responsible for this development. Since the turn of the century, the growth rate has recovered and caught up to the zero line. However, once again, the large differences between countries have to be mentioned. On the one hand are the steadily growing countries **Austria** and **Italy**, which have been joined again in this trend in the last two decades by **Slovenia,** and on the other hand are **Bulgaria**, **Hungary**, **Romania** and **Serbia**, which have experienced population decrease.

3.3. Fertility, Mortality and Net Migration

The decline of the growth rate is mainly caused by natural population decrease. At the beginning of the reporting period, the total fertility rate in the region was approximately 2.7 children on average per mother, it remained at around 2.5 until the mid-1970s and experienced – more than ten years after the birth decline in Western Europe – a moderate decrease to 1.8 children per mother. The fertility rate sharply declined over time and has remained below 1.5 since then. A theoretical framework explaining this time delay of European post-communist countries is the so called socialist greenhouse theory offered by Sobotka (2002) which describes the general social, political and institutional environment promoted by the socialist states aiming for extensive reproduction rates. Differences in fertility are influenced by the less liberal regimes of birth control imposed by some of the socialist states as described above, including restrictive abortion policies, punitive taxation of childless families or unmarried singles and a relatively limited choice

of modern contraception. Whether this change indicates a second demographic transition or demographic crisis is subject to current academic debates. However, the high unemployment and relative deprivation of larger households can be seen as circumstances that clearly signal that there will be no return of a high fertility level. The convergence tendency of the total-fertility rate and the disappearing variance of the rate emphasize the generality of the trend (see *Figure 5*).

The second factor influencing the slow-down of the population growth rate was migration. The country reports and data provided by the United Nations[26] allow for a long-term analysis of migration trends in the reporting countries. Major changes in the migratory trends within the region have emerged. At the beginning of the reporting period, most of the SEEMIG countries showed a net migration below zero, meaning that emigration at that time period exceeded immigration. Beginning with the 1960s, however, the region lost this homogeneity and in the following decades, the SEEMIG countries were increasingly characterised by a diversification of net migration rates.[27] While some regions became immigrant areas, others became or remained emigrant areas (Melegh 2012). Similar to other Western European countries, **Austria** and later on **Italy** and **Slovenia** experienced a favourable economic development and turned into *de facto* immigration countries. The active recruitment of foreign workers prevailed as labour market measures in order to fill labour market demands. **Romania**, **Bulgaria** and **Serbia** in particular became emigration countries, whereas countries like **Hungary** and **Slovakia**– according to the officially registered net migration rates – turned into 'emerging immigration countries'. In these countries, a positive migration balance was reached in the 1980s and probably in countries like **Hungary** it could easily be reversed by recent trends.[28] The *'Model of the Migration Cycle'* described in chapter 1.4.1 and in more detail in the conceptual paper offers a blueprint for analysing and interpreting this development (see *Figure 6*).

Based on the findings of the country reports and looking at net migration trends from 1950-2010 and when applying the migration transitions approach to the SEEMIG countries, three types of countries regarding migration status can be identified: Type 1 relatively "Old immigration countries", Type 2 „Emerging immigration countries" and Type 3 „Emigration countries" (see *Table 4*).

These types are characterised by specific migration patterns and policy attitudes. *Type 1 "Old immigration countries"* are located at the end of the adaptation cycle. These countries represent the overall European pattern of development: they showed a negative migration rate in the 1950s but their migration rates became positive parallel to the process observed on the entire continent. As the "tipping point" was already reached decades ago, they have learned to treat immigration politically, instrumentally as well as in the public discourse. In the SEEMIG region **Austria** and **Slovenia** belong to this group, next to other countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Type 2 "Emerging immigration countries": In these countries a positive migration balance has only been reached recently. The topic of immigration is a very contentious topic in the public discourse and the adaptation process is in a very early stage. **Italy** and partly also **Hungary** and **Slovakia** belong to this group alongside countries in Southern Europe such as Greece, Spain and

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26   *http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/migration.htm*
27   *Attention has to be paid to the fact that these net migration numbers are blurred as they do not show trends regarding immigration and emigration separately. Furthermore, attention has to be paid to the missing reliance of emigration data. For further information see introduction and chapter 4.*
28   *In **Hungary** the migration balance has been positive since the end of the 1980s, while in the last few years is very likely that it has become negative.*

Portugal as well as Ireland, which, especially before the global economic and financial crisis, have recently been confronted with significant immigration.

Type 3 "Emigration countries": these countries are still characterised by major emigration flows. However, it is likely that in future these countries could also become countries of immigration. Countries of Eastern Europe belong to this stage of constant and negative migration balance, amongst them **Bulgaria** and **Romania**, next to Poland. During the times of socialism and mobility constraints, immigration was not a major topic, also because the birth decline set in a later stage.

Table 4: Typology of SEEMIG countries by migration status, 2010

Type	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3
Designation	"(Relatively) old" immigration countries	"Emerging" immigration countries	"Emigration countries"
Country typology	Austria, Slovenia	Hungary, Italy, Slovakia	Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia*
Characteristics	Structural positive migration balance; starting consensus on immigration; after "legislation gap" a new migration regime is installed	First positive migration balance; Immigration as conflictuous topic in the public discourse; starting adaptation	Constant and negative migration balance; emigration (not immigration) are topics of public discourse

*Source: Fassmann and Reeger 2008 modified and amended. *With the exception of major refugee inflows during wars in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.*

The third main demographic factor that must be presented and analysed is the development of mortality. Two different observations must be underlined: The first one is increasing life expectancy of both males and females in the entire SEEMIG region. Over the whole period, the life expectancy at birth grew by around eight additional years or 1.4 years each decade. Nevertheless, while for the past 60 years all Western European countries, including **Austria** and **Italy**, have shown increases in life expectancy, Eastern European countries have had a different and altogether more negative experience. Between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, these long-term negative trends in Eastern European countries, for example in **Slovakia** and **Hungary**, were reversed. The gain of additional years of life is higher in the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain than before. In contrast to increasing unemployment or people living below the poverty line, the increasing life expectancy is a positive consequence of the transformation process.

However, differentiation is again necessary, because a growing divergence in the increase of life expectancy is apparent. Countries like **Austria** and **Italy** are gaining more years of life than – for example – **Bulgaria**, **Romania** and **Serbia**. While at the beginning of the reporting period the difference in life expectancy between **Austria** and **Romania** was around one year, by the end of the period, the difference had grown to around nine years. For the whole period, the population in **Austria** experienced an increase of 13 years, while in contrast the population of

Romania gained only five years. Differentiation by gender is also necessary. While men in general show a lower life expectancy than women, the mortality crisis of men in Eastern Europe has been subject to extensive academic research. With the female life expectancy increasing on average[29] by 9.5 years in the SEEMIG region; since 1960, the life expectancy of men grew only by 7.8 years. The gap between countries became wider both for the life expectancy of women as well as of men: while the difference between the highest and lowest life expectancy of women was 4.7 years in 1960, it has grown to 6.9 until 2011. The highest number of years was gained by women in Italy followed by women in **Austria** (12 years) and **Slovenia** (11.3 years). Women in **Bulgaria** however only gained 6.8 years in life expectancy. The gap in the life expectancy of men grew from 4 to 8.9 years. Life expectancy of men in **Italy** grew by 1.9 years and only three years in **Bulgaria**.

In general, the increase in lifespan is more due to a decrease in infant mortality than to additional years of life in old age. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, infant mortality in all countries of the SEEMIG region was reduced significantly by investment in medical services. Convergence and a decline of the infant mortality below 10 per thousand can be observed for the whole period and without historical breaks.[30] Furthermore, favourable trends that occurred in Western Europe as long ago as the early 1970s have spread to Eastern European countries. While it is still difficult to assess the main determinants of such a reversal, the progress probably results from a combination of several factors, including changes in diets, the growth of systematic prevention and screening and the spread of new forms of treatment and cardiac surgery (Meslé 2004) (see *Figure 7, 8, 9*).

As a consequence of birth decline, emigration of the mostly younger population and increasing life expectancy, a process of population ageing can be observed in the whole SEEMIG region. The tendency is to some extent parallel in all countries. However, when going into detail, significant and relevant differences became apparent. In the 1960s, **Austria** was at the forefront of an ageing process and far above all other SEEMIG countries. With the return of high net migration in the 1990s and 2000s, the share of elderly people as a percentage of the working age population decreased, but not because of emigration of the older population or increasing mortality. The working age population increased itself in absolute numbers as a consequence of immigration and, consequently, the old age-dependency ratio decreased. The opposite development can be observed in countries like **Bulgaria**. Due to the emigration of the working age population, the share of the older population relatively increased over-proportionally (see *Figure 10*).

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29   The calculations do not take into account **Serbia**, as comparative data was not available by gender.
30   It must be noted, however, that significant differences in infant mortality rates are still prevalent on the NUT3 level.

4. Spatial dimensions and perspectives

This fourth chapter is dedicated to 'spatially' embedding some of the aforementioned and more recent key processes in the SEEMING region, by focussing on the period of 2001 to 2011. It hence serves to examine patterns along selected demographic and socio-economic indicators by tracing geographical similarities and deviations across countries. The focus is threefold: First, the wider perspective on the national level is emphasized, secondly, patterns are sketched out at smaller scales, by zooming into the 61 NUTS2 or 280 NUTS3 regions, and finally the results of selected local studies are summarised.[31]

4.1 Tracing patterns at SEEMIG country levels

The SEEMIG area is generally characterised by a marked East-West differentiation regarding its demographic trends. The EU15 countries of **Austria** and **Italy** show the most pronounced demographic growth, followed by **Slovenia** and **Slovakia** as EU8 countries. By contrast, the other four SEEMIG countries are characterised by population decline. The prevailing trends are increasing life expectancy, moderate total fertility rates below the replacement level, postponement of childbearing and an increase of the marital age. This is either partially counteracted by immigration or reinforced by emigration.

A variety of current demographic situations – be it naturally induced or a result of migration – can be observed in the SEEMIG countries. To document these variations, a simple demographic typology is constructed based upon a *Weber diagram*. The countries are divided into two main groups, i.e. countries with shrinking or with growing population. The direct reasons for shrinking and growing are a loss or gain due to international migration or an excess or deficit of births over deaths, meaning natural population development.

In order to reveal the importance of these components of population change, the two main groups are broken down into three sub groups. *A, B* and *C countries* are characterised by growing populations. In an *A country*, growth is induced by positive net migration as well as a birth surplus; in *B countries*, growth is only induced by a positive net migration; and in *C countries*, growth is only induced by natural growth. *D, E* and *F countries* are demographically shrinking. In an *E country*, the population loss mainly caused by a birth deficit coupled with positive net migration, and in a D country the migration balance is negative, but the number of births exceeds the number of deaths. Finally, *F countries* experience population decrease both due to negative net migration and birth deficit (see *Figure 11*).

In line with their status as mature immigration countries, **Austria** and **Slovenia** are the only countries experiencing population growth due to both demographic components (*Type A*). By contrast, the younger immigration countries in the SEEMIG area more marked by diverging developments: **Italy** is notably profiting from immigration while it is also affected by negative natural change (*Type B*), but **Slovakia** shows positive gains through natural population increase (*Type C*).

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31   For further maps and overviews on selected core indicators on regional level, see also Annex B and Annex C.

All other countries of the SEEMIG region are classified as *E* or *F countries*. In **Hungary**, gains from migration have a mitigating effect on the overall population decrease, but cannot halt the shrinking process (*Type E*). Finally, the current 'emigration countries' in the SEEMIG area are the most affected by population decrease; both EU 2 countries **Bulgaria** and **Romania** as well as **Serbia** show negative values for both components (*Type F*). However, values gained via the calculated migration balance and the net migration rate derived from flow data show great dissimilarities and are hardly comparable and reliable. Furthermore, even though they constitute the most reliable data available for estimating the population stock, some census data are markedly biased by blurred recording of emigration[32] and incomplete capturing of resident population.[33] Thus, effects of emigration are very likely to be of greater magnitude (see *Map 1*).

Close relations between the economic development and the demographic classification of a country are apparent. The *A countries* in the SEEMIG area represent the strongest economies that were able to bridge the economic crisis after 2008 without deeper frictions. In terms of GDP, *A, B* and *C countries* reach the only results above the SEEMIG average, which accounted for 72 per cent of the EUR27 average in 2010 (*see Figure 13*). At the same time, their unemployment rates tend to be below the EU27 average[34] (*see Figure 3*). In general, as mentioned in the introduction of this paper, a strong economy sends signals of optimism both to the native population as well as to potential immigrants. Furthermore, if potential migrants realise their plans and move to an *A* or *B country*, the country of destination benefits twofold: an increase in the size of younger age groups and an increase of births due the gain of potential mothers and fathers.

The contrary is true in *E* and *F countries* – they show GDP levels below the SEEMIG average, and unemployment rates that are mostly above the EU27 average[35]. A weak and struggling economy cannot offer to their population the optimistic feeling that is necessary for pro-natalist attitudes, and brain drain effects[36] are likely to pursue. At the same time, such negative signals may deter potential immigrants. Nevertheless, *F countries* are also currently recording residing immigrants, even if they only amounted to below 1 per cent of the total population in 2011, thus rendering the cartographic visualisation of immigrant stocks obsolete in the context of this paper. Regions of origin are mainly located in neighbouring countries; thus, migratory trajectories are

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32 In **Romania**, for instance, data on the resident population is strongly blurred due to under-registration of emigration, leading to severe reliability problems. According to census 2011 figures, the number of residents amounts to 20.1 million people, while calculations based on the census 2002 result in more than 21 million people for the same year. Given these uncertainties regarding the reference population, all demographic and human development indicators are affected and distorted, from total fertility rate to infant mortality.

33 Conceptualisations of 'usually resident population' as well as groups that are generally considered may change from one census to another. In **Serbia**, for instance, internally displaced persons (IDPs) were not included in the 2002 census, but they were included in the 2011 census, while persons of Albanian ethnicity boycotted the census of 2011.

34 With the exception of **Slovakia**. The unemployment rate in 2011 amounted to 13.5 per cent, but enhanced mobility due to increasing Europeanisation has a mitigating effect to some extent. Better access to new job opportunities abroad resulted in increasing cross-border commuting, particularly to the Czech Republic and **Austria**, thus reducing official unemployment.

35 Except **Romania**, where the unemployment rate did not significantly rise due to post-transitional de-industrialisation, because of emigration and subsistence farming.

36 According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2011, E and F countries are particularly low ranked as regards brain drain (Bulgaria: rank 128 out of 144, **Hungary**: 129, **Romania**: 136, **Serbia**: 141), by contrast, A countries fare notably better (**Austria**:32, **Slovenia**: 83), but B and C countries also show comparably higher values (Italy: 155, Slovakia: 122) (Schwab 2013; based on World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey).

strongly shaped by ethnic factors, either due to facilitated entry or due to ethnic discrimination.[37] However, economic reasons and family ties also play an important role, also regarding processes that are interpreted as ethnically driven. Immigration from traditional countries of destination can be largely ascribed to return migration, which also includes retirement re-migration. In some cases, new countries of origin have arisen in the recent past. For a number of years, for example, China has ranked among the top five countries of origin in **Hungary** and **Romania**, when considering the differential category of 'citizenship'. This can be attributed to enhanced segmented labour markets or specific economic niches. Thus, changing migratory patterns suggest that (some) current emigration countries could change into immigration countries in the long run. A country's integration into the world economy, and thus the level of dependency on outmigration and remittances, as well as the fragility of large scale investment may also play a crucial role in this regard. However, it is hard to predict whether and when countries of type *E* and *F* could transform into *A, B* or *C*: the presented differentiation is of high relevance in the SEEMIG region at the current stage (see *Map 2*).

4.2 Disparities at the regional level

The presented typology of countries can be applied to the regional level as well. This is necessary in order to gain a more precise picture of the mechanisms and the circumstances of growing and shrinking regions. The main results are discussed in this section.

The majority of regions (55%) are classified as D, E or F and are thus shrinking regions. This result and the fact that such regions can be found throughout all SEEMIG countries, even if some of them show overall positive developments at the national level, emphasize the need for more intensive reflection about shrinking regions, and the consequences for population policies as well as regional policies aiming at counteracting or adapting to these developments. In total, only 45 per cent of the examined NUTS3 regions[38] experienced population growth and are categorised as A, B or C.

In accordance with the overall population development at the national level, most of the **Italian** and **Austrian** regions are categorised as A, B or C regions and show a distinct population increase. However, most of the regions in **Bulgaria** (93%), **Romania** (98%) and **Serbia** (88%) are classified as D, E or F regions. This is to some extent a dramatic result of the analysis: Shrinking tendencies are apparent throughout all countries, and only some minor islands of growth remain. Thus, demographic shrinking is one of the most serious challenges of some of the SEEMIG countries (see *Map 3*).

Nevertheless, constituting an *E* or *F country* does not necessarily mean that all regions are experiencing shrinking trends. On the contrary, regional development paths vary, particularly

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37 *'Ethnicity' as a statistical differential category has experienced conjuncture since the fall of the Iron Curtain, but was scarcely of importance during socialist times. It should be noted that the ethnic dimension cannot be exhaustively captured by current statistical enumerations, neither as regards the population stock nor as concerns migratory flows. For instance, in **Austria, Italy** and **Slovenia** the dimension "ethnicity" per se is not recorded in the census. **Slovakia** as a C country as well as the E and F countries capture ethnicity in their census, but it is merely based on self-identification. This implies several statistical limitations, i.e. categories might overlap and might change from one census to another. The possibility of obtaining dual citizenship, for instance in the case of **Serbia, Hungary** and **Romania**, or facilitated access to naturalisation for 'ethnic nationals' may hinder statistical recording. Finally, some minorities like the Roma are hardly reachable in statistical terms.*

38 *All 280 SEEMIG regions on the NUTS3 level were examined. Remarks: **Serbia**, without Kosovo and Metohija, reference year 2002.*

in larger countries, and all SEEMIG countries show growth poles and depopulating areas. Nine out of the ten regions with the most impressive growth are located in **Italy,** and the **Romanian** region of *Ilfov* ranks at place five. Among the ten NUTS3 regions with the strongest decline are three **Italian** regions, one **Serbian** region and six **Bulgarian** regions.[39]

Hence, despite the large differentiation at the national level, clear similarities in sub-national spatial developments have become manifest. Capital cities, for example, are in a privileged position in nearly all SEEMIG countries. *Belgrade* in the case of **Serbia** is a good example, *Ljubljana* in the case of **Slovenia** or *Sofia* (and *Varna*) in case of **Bulgaria.** Capital cities (or larger regional cities) are poles of economic growth and – as a consequence thereof – of demographic growth as well. They show the best relative accessibility of all regions, can rely on a large, flexible and highly qualified labour force and the concentration of the economic and political decision making process give theses capitals an extra bonus. In some cases, growth effects are relocated to surrounding areas due to suburbanisation processes; this is the case in **Romania** (*Ilfov*, next to *Bucureşti*) or **Hungary** (*Pest*, surrounding *Budapest*).

Finally, a specific North-South or West-East differentiation is apparent as a consequence of large-scale geographical factors or as an expression of the '*long durée*' in the regional development. In **Italy**, more than one third of the Italian population is concentrated in three regions, i.e. *Lombardia*, *Campania* and *Lazio*; however, *Sardegna* is particularly marked by shrinking processes. **Slovakia**, by contrast, features an East-West gradient where the central areas are more marked by population decline than the Western areas, gaining mainly through migration, or the Eastern areas, marked by comparably high fertility levels.

Demographic change implies significant shifts in age structures, which is recognisable in all SEEMIG countries. For the whole region, the share of the working age population (ages 15-64) decreased from 67.8 per cent in 2001 to 66.5 per cent in 2011. In parallel, the old age dependency ratio increased from 25.3 per cent in to 26.6 per cent. As regions of type *C* and *D* are generally shaped by positive natural population development, their age structures are slightly better positioned (*see also Figure 12*). In general, rural areas and emigration regions are in danger of losing their younger population quicker than agglomerations due to migratory selectivity.

However, the status as a definite emigration region does not necessarily imply the most unfavourable age structure, and strong deviations among regions may occur. For instance, shrinking NUTS3 regions in total showed a lower old-age dependency ratio in 2011 than SEEMIG regions on average or growing regions (24.4% vs. 26.8% vs. 28.9%). However, in some regions, lower fertility, increasing life expectancy and/or ongoing emigration are leading to increased population ageing. Thus, **Romania** is demographically younger than the other *F countries* (19.9% vs. **Bulgaria** 25.9% or **Serbia** 24.5%); twelve Romanian and eight **Slovakian** regions constitute the 20 youngest SEEMIG regions.[40] The oldest SEEMIG regions are located in the *B country* of **Italy** (31%), which has 19 out of the 20 oldest regions and is again marked by a North-South dichotomy. In brief, population ageing is a major trend that affects all SEEMIG NUTS3 regions.

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39 *Top 10 growth regions 2001-2011 NUTS3): Reggio nell'Emilia (IT), Lodi (IT), Bergamo (IT), Brescia (IT), Ilfov (RO), Treviso (IT), Trento (IT), Verona, Latina (IT), Vicenza (IT).*
   Top 10 shrinking regions 2011-2011 (NUTS3): Nuoro (IT), Pčinja area (RS), Cagliari (IT), Sassari (IT), Kardzhali (BG), Vratsa (BG), Vidin (BG), Razgrad (BG), Montana (BG) and Yambol (BG).
40 *Once again, this picture is likely to be blurred by incomplete statistics on Romanians who have emigrated.*

Correlations of higher significance between the levels of GDP per capita and unemployment rates can be contested for the NUTS2 level[41] in the context of the linkages of the demographic typology with the economic development; hence, the higher the GDP of a region, the lower the unemployment rate. Concomitant with this, growth regions generally have a higher regional GDP and might be more attractive for both immigrants and commuters.[42] Thus, agglomerations such as *Bratislavský kraj* in **Slovakia**, *Vienna* and regional capital cities in **Austria** and prospering cities in Northern **Italy** are among the regions with the highest regional GDP values in the SEEMIG area (*see Figure 13 and Map 4).*This again has an attracting effect both for international and internal immigrants as well as for commuters.

It is obvious that shrinking regions with marked migratory losses more often face economic difficulties; remote areas like the **Bulgarian** regions of *Severen tsentralen*, *Yuzhen tsentralen* and *Yugoiztochen* or the **Serbian** region of *Southern and Eastern Serbia*[43] are thus represented at the very bottom of the GDP rankings, population decrease and negative migration balance.

These are just some examples of regions that are particularly affected by migratory selectivity and, thus, jeopardised by limited availability of human capital and skill mismatch.

Subsumed, demographic and economic polarisation as well as persisting regional specificities are the main factors that shape the development of SEEMIG regions. These diverging trends are very likely to further intensify in the future and thus imply far reaching challenges regarding (1) regional disparities in economic growth potentials due to changing labour markets, (2) the maintenance of welfare systems due to enhanced social polarisation and (3) environmental pressure. Population ageing, migration and integration / diversity management are thus policy fields that challenge the adaptive capacities at the regional and local level (see *Map 4*).

4.3. Findings from the local level – selected case studies

The SEEMIG partner consortium involves six regional and local authorities whose territories serve as local case studies in the context of the country reports.[44] In this chapter, similarities or convergences between the SEEMIG case studies and their countries will be traced and selected specificities that shape development paths will be briefly addressed.

Some local case studies show developments similar or comparable to those of their nation states. For instance, the **Bulgarian** region of *Montana* follows the overall national trend of population decrease due to a combination of a birth deficit and outmigration based on unfavourable economic circumstances (*Type F*). This results in the depopulation of most of its small municipalities and in challenges to the infrastructure, lack of investments and low wage levels. The same is true for the **Serbian** town of *Kanjiža*, which is located in the NUTS3 region of *Severno-Banatski Okrug (Type F)*. In the case of the latter, immigrant flows do not necessarily lead to increasing numbers of resident population, as the town

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41 Due to limited data availability as regards GDP data for NUTS3 regions and restricted statistical meaningfulness of LFS data for lower territorial levels, only the NUTS2 level is examined in this context.

42 In some regions, the utilised GDP per capita figures can be distinctly biased by commuter flows. Net commuter inflows can increase production far above figures that could be achieved by resident population alone. In contrast, GDP per capita might be underestimated in regions marked by commuter outflow.

43 Note: no directly comparable values are available for **Serbian** NUTS2 regions. However, national data on GDP per capita in 2010 reveals substantial intra-national differences (Index 100 = Serbia): Belgrade 178, Vojvodina 97, Šumadija and Western Serbia 70, Southern and Eastern Serbia 64.

44 As no local project partners are participating in SEEMIG for Austria and Italy, no case studies were elaborated for these two countries.

is mainly a (temporary) destination for asylum seekers due to its location at the external EU border.

In contrast, local development paths can also differ from national ones. This is demonstrated by the **Hungarian** city of *Pécs* and its surrounding region *Baranya* (NUTS3), which are both experiencing population decline due to suburbanisation, re-ruralisation and emigration processes as well as a widening gap between births and deaths (*Type F; HU: Type E*). However, both the region and the city are lagging behind the national economic trends as a result of massive de-industrialisation since the political transition. To a certain, but only temporary extent, *Pécs'* status as a university town of increasing international importance in the recent past helps in counteracting these negative developments and in mitigating brain drain effects. However, although the recruitment of foreign students is succeeding, foreign students hardly gain employment after their graduation. Another case study showing a population decrease despite the slightly mitigating effects of positive internal migration is the **Slovakian** city of *Turčianske Teplice* (*Type E; SK: Type C*), which follows other trajectories than its surrounding NUTS3 region of *Žilinský kraj* (*Type D*). The town is facing more pronounced population ageing than Slovakia as a whole, but the unemployment rate as well as the education attainment show more favourable values. The **Slovenian** city of *Maribor* and its embracing *Podravje* region (NUTS3) have long been prospering because of migration (*Type B, SI: Type A*) originating mainly from other successor states of Former Yugoslavia.

Finally, the two **Romanian** case studies show diverging developments, even though they are in spatial proximity to each other and are both constituted by predominantly rural areas with a high proportion of ethnic Hungarians. The NUTS3 region of *Harghita* can be categorised as *Type F* like Romania as a whole and thus as a shrinking region due to negative natural and migratory developments. *Sfântu Gheorghe* is the capital town of the NUTS3 region of *Covasna*, which constitutes a *D region* marked by a birth surplus that cannot absorb emigration; population is thus declining.

Development patterns at smaller territorial scales not only depend on general national or global developments, but also on further shaping factors such as a region's geographical location or centrality, its accessibility and connectivity and its intra-national economic and administrative integration. Local settings may be of specific importance, i.e. labour markets structures and their change over time, educational establishments, specific migratory flows and urban-rural or cross-border mobility relations.

To summarise, the SEEMIG local case studies display different settings, but nevertheless mostly face population decline and depopulation, with the exception of the **Slovenian** case of *Maribor/Podravje*. However, although common challenges appear regarding demographic ageing throughout all examined areas, an appropriate recognition at the strategic level is not always given. For some case studies, development strategies to address these challenges have been elaborated. In this context, data constraints that hamper evidence-based strategy formulation have become clear, which is once again in line with findings for higher territorial levels. For instance, it is said to be 'common local knowledge' that a large number of persons emigrate from *Pécs* or *Maribor*, but they hardly appear in statistics owing to lacking incentives for deregistration. Moreover, effective strategies to counteract emigration or to manage population decline are lacking. Existing strategic papers are mostly not based on a realistic perception of demographic realities. The lack of data strengthens this situation, because real and hence perhaps alarming data does currently not disturb the prevailing perceptions that are more triggered by wishful thinking than by a process of recognition of given realities. Thus, the further enhancement of evidence bases at the local level would be conducive for more realistically assessing local developments more realistically, also in a comparative manner.

5. Conclusions

This dynamic historical analysis that has been carried out for the SEEMIG region for the period 1950 to 2013 has shown that the SEEMIG region has been characterised by several **historical turning points** that concerned countries within the region to different extents and has contributed to a historically given heterogeneity: wars, post-war transformations and recovery, the breakdown of socialist regimes, the dissolution of countries and changes in political regimes from totalitarianism to democracy have affected the countries. Recently, (pre-)accession to the greater economic and political space of the European Union has marked regional developments. One of the main findings in this regard is that the influence of political systems can be observed and should not be neglected; however, while the relevance of the political context in the shaping of socio-demographic and economic developments was generally stressed by the country reports, for some variables, political influence only led to a delay of a general trend. The different social histories of 'backwardness' of different regions included in the space designated as 'South-East Europe' as framed by Chirot (1991), seem to contribute to differences between regions as they might have their roots in the historically accumulated structural differences.

General trends of convergence and divergence could be traced in the region as far back as the 1950s. **Trends of convergence** relate for instance for trends of fertility; with some delay in time, a convergence tendency of the total fertility rate and a disappearing variance of the rate emphasize the general trend of low fertility throughout the region. The total fertility rate declined sharply over time in all countries and has remained at a low level below 1.5. The high unemployment and relative deprivation of larger households are circumstances that clearly signal that there will be no return of a high fertility level. The SEEMIG region also reflects the overall European trend of population ageing. Throughout all SEEMIG countries, the proportion of the population at working age has been consistently decreasing (or stagnating) and reached a level of 66.5 per cent in 2011, while the share of persons at retirement age climbed to 17.7 per cent (EU2 27: 15.5%). The changes in the age structure are irreversible and entail a range of challenges for public budgets in securing services of general interests, individual mobility with public transport as well as in maintaining pension and health care systems. This also implies societal and inter-generational potentials for conflicts as well as direct and indirect implications for the labour market.

One of the **trends of divergence** is noted in the area of mortality: while an increasing life expectancy can be observed throughout the region, a growing divergence in the increase of life expectancy between countries is apparent. Divergences are also prevalent regarding economic developments: while the entire SEEMIG region is a growing economic region in the long-term perspective and has improved its position against the world average, with some countries producing three times more GDP than the world average and others only producing half, the main differences in the economic performance of countries within the region are predominant. These differences might also have influenced the fact that net migration also showed diverging trends; since the 1960s, the SEEMIG countries have been progressively characterised by a diversification of net migration rates. While some countries became immigration countries, others became or remained emigration countries. Migration is as such a key driver of population development in the region. The overall population growth of the region can be almost exclusively traced back to

immigration to the immigration countries in the region, such as **Austria** and **Italy**, which has also stemmed from emigration from other countries within the region.

A further characteristic of the region is the **existence of large-scale disparities**; population growth within the region is concentrated in the capital and large cities as well as in the more Western and economically prosperous countries (**Austria**, **Italy** and **Slovenia**). However, 55 per cent of all NUTS3 regions in the SEEMIG area show a population decline in the past decade and demographic prognoses show that this trend will continue. Such regions can be found throughout all SEEMIG countries, but are concentrated in the Eastern and South-Eastern parts of the SEEMIG area. Already today, but even more so in the future, the SEEMIG region will consist of a number of 'urban islands of growth' surrounded by large areas affected by population decline. In summary, demographic and economic polarisations as well as persisting regional specificities are the main factors that shape the development of SEEMIG regions. These diverging trends are very likely to further intensify in the future and thus imply far reaching challenges regarding (1) regional disparities in economic growth potentials due to changing labour markets, (2) the maintenance of welfare systems due to enhanced social polarisation and (3) environmental pressure. Population ageing, migration and integration / diversity management are thus policy fields that challenge the adaptive capacities at the regional and local level. Concepts therefore seem necessary to actively manage depopulation and shrinking processes via de-structuring measures, in order to prevent unorganised and long-lasting gradual decline that entails successive and unequal deterioration of living conditions in the concerned areas. Thus, concepts are necessary to guarantee that people living in depopulated regions have a minimum standard of social and health infrastructures, based on constitutional rights (equality of living conditions) and social justice.

When zooming into smaller territorial scales by examining development paths of the local case studies as involved in the SEEMIG project, significant heterogeneity becomes apparent. National or global developments impinge as broader exogenous factors as well as a municipality's or city's relative positioning within a country take effect. Hence, a region's geographical location or centrality, its accessibility and connectivity and its intra-national economic and administrative integration also determine whether a municipality or city is shrinking or growing. Finally, specific endogenous local settings may be of decisive importance, i.e. labour markets structures and their change over time, educational establishments, specific migratory flows and urban-rural or cross-border mobility relations. However, even if most considered local cases face population decline, there are neither effective strategies in place to counteract emigration or to manage population decline, nor are there existing strategic papers underpinned by statistical data. Thus, realistic perceptions of demographic realities are largely lacking.

6. Facing future challenges – an approach towards capturing policy areas

Chapter 5 addressed conclusions drawn from the observed empirical findings of the historical analysis in terms of policies for the SEEMIG area and countries. The dynamic historical analysis has shown that the SEEMIG region shows trends of conversion but also at the same time trends of divergence in regard to socio-economic and demographic trends. Furthermore, the existence of large-scale disparities among the countries as well as within countries makes it difficult to draw policy conclusions. Since various social, economic and political concerns are addressed, potential answers could be diverse. This paper accordingly does not offer an inventory of policy recommendations, which is neither regarded as appropriate nor applicable, as ready-made and identical recipes for regions located in the extremely diverse SEEMIG area do not seem beneficial. Instead, concrete and tailor-made policies that respond to the needs of the specific local environment appear pertinent. Having said this, the following policy areas and actions are seen as relevant for the region as a whole and could serve as a starting point and provide guidance for the development of space-sensitive and tailor-made policies in the SEEMIG area:

1. **Pro-active long-term management of the ageing process**. With the SEEMIG region reflecting the overall European long-term trend of population ageing, the irreversible changes in the age structure entail societal and inter-generational potentials for conflicts, direct and indirect implications for the labour market as well as challenges for public budgets in securing services of general interests, individual mobility with public transport and in maintaining pension and health care systems. Because ageing is a long-term process, long-term measures are necessary. The postponement of policy measures and simplification of the issue to election rhetoric – as often observed – appears obstructive.

2. **Development of local adaptation strategies for population decline**. Population growth in the SEEMIG region is concentrated in the capital and large cities as well as in the more Western and economically prosperous countries and nearly 60 per cent of all NUTS3 regions in the SEEMIG area show a population decline which is expected to continue also in the future. For this reason, concepts are necessary to actively manage depopulation and shrinking processes via de-structuring measures, in order to prevent unorganised and long-lasting gradual decline that entails successive and unequal deterioration of living conditions in the concerned areas. Thus, approaches are necessary that guarantee people living in depopulated regions a minimum standard of social and health infrastructures, based on constitutional rights (equality of living conditions) and social justice.

3. **Realisation that unfavourable demographic developments and regional disparities can be overcome**. Although, depopulation and demographic ageing are deep-rooted societal processes that cannot simply be stopped or reversed by isolated policy measures, policy-makers should not fall prey to ignoring the issue as a comfortable alternative. It seems crucial that SEEMIG countries as well as their regions and

cities develop plans and instruments to attract enterprises that offer inhabitants of depopulated areas new economic opportunities. These economic activities should be sustainable and use the specific quality of a region to be competitive in the long run (smart specialisation strategy). Furthermore, it seems important to develop specific instruments that allow families and the younger population to stay and realise their desire to have children, while at the same time assuring the feasibility of combinating work and family. A new family policy is necessary that focuses on specific targets and is space-sensitive. Other examples of policy areas include housing, education, mobility, care and health. A 'one size fits all' policy seems to be increasingly less appropriate in the context of regional disparities; instead, place-based approaches are required.

4. **Acknowledgement and use of the potential of migration**. International migration – especially emigration – is often merely perceived from the angle of national perspective and, as such, as a loss and damage to national pride. It is remarkable how national statistical systems adhere to this attitude: by defining emigrants as temporarily absent persons, for instance, national statistics often are short-sighted and do not properly take account of emigration. Modern societies are highly mobile in terms of spatial and social mobility. People are coming and going and within the political and legal framework of the European Union, and it is not possible to control movement. SEEMIG countries should therefore interpret international (as well as internal) migration as a management task. Questions relating to keeping ties with emigrants, using the potentials of diaspora communities for economic and social development, promotion of virtual, short-term or permanent return of experts for exchange of knowledge and experience or the eased and safe transfer and sustainable use of remittances arise. As even emigration countries are destination countries for regular and irregular migrants, integration is the other aspect where the potentials arising from migration should be more thoroughly explored. Although it is of less pronounced magnitude in quantitative terms in most SEEMIG countries, immigration also needs to be actively managed, also regarding migrants' access to services, housing and the labour market as well as their social and political inclusion.

5. **Refraining from employing ethnicity for political reasons**. The collaboration within the SEEMIG project and the results of the analysis made it clear that ethnicity has been rediscovered throughout the SEEMIG area in recent decades and is seen in direct or indirect linkage with migration. In a range of countries, ethnicity plays a crucial role in statistics, dividing groups of immigrants into those of the same ethnic belonging as the majority population, and those constituting foreign nationals or 'ethnically others'. It became clear that notions of the 'nation state as a container' with fixed borders and a homogeneous population prevail or have been reinforced in the wake of nation-building processes in the recent past, which is reflected not only in statistics, but also in concrete policy actions. However, such a form of 'othering' by rediscovering ethnicity implies different valuations based simply on blurred, alterable self-attribution and may hence lead to or facilitate the exclusion of specific groups. Rediscovering ethnicity will not solve demographic problems; however, as migration is often closely linked to ethnic ties, it has to be acknowledged that it will remain a driver for migration – as

push factor for emigration (e.g. exclusion or lack in equality due to (legal) framework, ethnic discrimination) and as a pull factor for immigration (e.g. easier naturalisation due to ethnic affiliation and dual citizenship). Focussing on such forms of migration policy is a far cry from exploiting the spectrum of real migration management: It is an isolated, nation state orientated answer to challenges resulting from an unavoidably heterogeneous composition of a country's population, thus implying dangers of fostering pro-nationalist attitudes and of reinforcing social disparities. Approaches actively addressing cultural and social diversity and recognising different life styles and realities are more required than shelving arrangements.

6. **Necessity for increased transnational collaboration and cooperation**. International migration is a transnational phenomenon that often affects border regions on both sides of the borders, and as such needs to be researched and treated jointly across borders. Transnational policy thinking seems particularly pertinent in the SEEMIG region, as there are important migratory links within the region. This is even more important as the results of the completed work packages show – surprisingly and disappointingly – that statistical deficits regarding migration are overwhelming. The countries in the SEEMIG region have developed various statistical concepts and statistical strategies. Moreover, emigration is an underestimated phenomenon in all investigated countries. Small-scale statistics that are necessary to develop tailor-made evidence-based political concepts for regions and cities are currently inadequately available. The potentiality of international collaboration has also not yet been systematically used to correct migration statistics. A common vision on how to implement register-based systems for countries where this seems appropriate would bring cost-efficiency and quality. At the same time, the joint elaboration of alternative data collection methods such as specialised migration surveys seems more sustainable and relevant. Finally, thinking outside national containers seems imperative for generating and maximising the benefits of migration for the countries of origin as well as countries of destination and last but not least migrants themselves.

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List of Working Papers

1. Heinz Fassmann, Elisabeth Musil: Conceptual framework for modelling longer term migratory, labour market and human capital processes

2. Éva Gárdos, Irén Gödri: Analysis of existing migratory data production systems and major data sources in eight South-East European countries

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